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Abstract
This paper introduces three new types of combinatorial designs, which we call external dif-
ference families (EDF), external BIBDs (EBIBD) and splitting BIBDs. An EDF is a special
type of EBIBD, so existence of an EDF implies existence of an EBIBD. We construct optimal
splitting A-codes by using EDF. Then we give a new bound on the number of shares required
in robust secret sharing schemes (i.e., schemes secure against cheaters). EDF can be used to
construct robust secret sharing schemes that are optimal with respect to the new bound. We also
prove a weak converse, showing that if there exists an optimal secret sharing scheme, then there
exists an EBIBD. Finally, we derive a Fisher-type inequality for splitting BIBDs. We also prove
a weak equivalence between splitting BIBDs and splitting A-codes. Further, it is shown that an
EDF implies a splitting BIBD.
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1. Introduction
Combinatorial designs have played an important role in cryptology. In this
paper, we introduce three types of new combinatorial designs, external di>erence
families (EDF), external BIBDs (EBIBD) and splitting BIBDs and show their ap-
plications to splitting authentication codes and secret sharing schemes secure against
cheaters.
An EDF can be considered as an extension of di>erence sets and di>erence families.
An EBIBD is a generalization of a balanced incomplete block design (BIBD). These
concepts are deDned in the next section, where we prove that an EDF is equivalent to
an EBIBD having a particular automorphism group. In the remainder of the paper, we
discuss applications of these designs to authentication codes and robust secret sharing
schemes.
An authentication code (A-code) is called splitting if a message is not uniquely
determined by the plaintext (source state) and the key. This concept is very important
in the context of authentication codes with arbitration (see [11,12,4,6–9]). For splitting
A-codes, lower bounds on cheating probabilities [5,1] and a lower bound on the size
of keys [13,2] are known. However, no schemes were known which meet both these
bounds. We show that splitting A-codes with perfect secrecy which meet both of these
bounds can be obtained by using EDF.
In a (k; n) secret sharing scheme, a secret s is distributed to n participants, P1; : : : ; Pn.
A piece of information given to Pi is called a share and is denoted by vi. Tompa and
Woll [14] considered the following scenario. Suppose that k−1 participants P1; : : : ; Pk−1
want to cheat the kth participant Pk by opening forged shares v′1; : : : ; v
′
k−1. They succeed
if the secret s′ reconstructed from v′1; : : : ; v
′
k−1 and vk is di>erent from the original
secret s.
Recently, a lower bound on the size of shares for this problem was derived in [10].
There it was shown that |Vi|¿ (|S| − 1)=+1, where Vi denotes the set of possible
shares for participant Pi; S denotes the set of possible secrets, and  denotes the
cheating probability.
This bound can be met with equality if ¿ 1=|S|. However, if ¡ 1=|S|, then the
bound cannot be met. Here we present a new lower bound on |Vi| in the case where
¡ 1=|S|. We show that
|Vi|¿ 1 + |S| − 1|S|2 :
Then we show that secret sharing schemes which meet the new bound can be obtained
by using EDF. Further, we prove a weak converse, namely that if there exists a secret
sharing scheme which meets our bound, then there exists an EBIBD.
Finally, we derive a Fisher-type inequality for splitting BIBDs. We also prove a
weak equivalence between splitting BIBDs and splitting A-codes. Further, it is shown
that an EDF implies a splitting BIBD.
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2. New combinatorial designs
In this section, we introduce two new types of combinatorial designs, external dif-
ference families (EDF) and external BIBDs (EBIBD), and we show that an EDF is
equivalent to an EBIBD with a particular automorphism.
2.1. External di=erence family (EDF)
First, we give deDnitions of di>erence sets and di>erence families.
Denition 2.1 (Colbourn and Dinitz [3]). Let (X;+) be an Abelian group of order v.
A subset D ⊆ X is a (v; c; )-di=erence set if |D|= c and the multiset
{x − y: x; y∈D; x = y}= (X \{0}):
Example 2.1. D={0; 1; 3} is a (7; 3; 1)-di>erence set in the group (Z7;+). Indeed, the
di>erences modulo 7 are
1− 0 = 1; 3− 0 = 3; 3− 1 = 2; 0− 1 = 6; 0− 3 = 4; 1− 3 = 5:
This is also shown in Table 1, where the (i; j) entry is di −dj mod 7. Each element in
Z7\{0} appears exactly once in Table 1.
Denition 2.2 (Colbourn and Dinitz [3]). Let (X;+) be an Abelian group of order v.
A (v; c; )-di=erence family over X is a collection of u subsets of X; {D1; : : : ; Du},
such that |D1|= · · ·= |Du|= c and the multiset union⋃
i
{x − y: x; y∈Di; x = y}= (X \{0}):
Example 2.2. D1 ={0; 1}; D2 ={0; 2} and D3 ={0; 3} form a (7; 2; 1)-di>erence family
over Z7, where u=3. This is shown in Table 2, where each element in Z7\{0} appears
exactly once in the diagonal submatrices.
Now we deDne a new combinatorial design that we call an external di>erence family
(EDF).
Denition 2.3. Let (X;+) be an Abelian group of order v. A (v; c; ) u-EDF (or, exter-
nal di=erence family) over X is a collection of u subsets of X , denoted {D1; : : : ; Du},
Table 1
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Table 2
Table 3
such that (1) |D1|= · · ·= |Du|= c and (2) the multiset union⋃
i =j
(Di − Dj) = (X \{0});
where Di − Dj is the multiset {x − y: x∈Di; y∈Dj}.
Example 2.3. D1={0; 1} and D2={2; 4} form a (9; 2; 1) 2-EDF over Z9. This is shown
in Table 3, where each element in Z9\{0} appears exactly once in the o>-diagonal
submatrices.
Example 2.4. D1 = {0; 1; : : : ; t− 1} and D2 = {t; 2t; : : : ; t2} form a (2t2 + 1; t; 1) 2-EDF
over Z2t2+1.
We now state a couple of fundamental properties of EDF. First, it is easy to see
that if there exists a (v; c; ) u-EDF, then
(v− 1) = k(k − c) = c2u(u− 1); (1)
where k = cu.
Theorem 2.1. In a (v; c; ) u-EDF (D1; : : : ; Du) over X , for all a∈X ,
Na , |{x: x∈Di; x − a∈Dj; i = j}|=
{
0 if a= 0
 if a = 0:
(2)
Proof. It is clear that N0 = 0. For a = 0, from the deDnition, we have
= |{(x; y): x − y = a; x∈Di; y∈Dj; i = j}|
= |{x: x∈Di; x − a∈Dj; i = j}|= Na;
letting y = x − a.
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2.2. External BIBD
The deDnition of a balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) is given as follows.
Denition 2.4 (Colbourn and Dinitz [3]). A (v; b; r; l; )-BIBD is a pair (X;B) in which
X is a set of v elements called points, B is a set of b l-subsets of X called blocks,
each point is contained in exactly r blocks, and each pair of distinct points is contained
in exactly  blocks. If v=b (equivalently, if r=k), then the BIBD is called symmetric,
and denoted (v; l; )-SBIBD. It is known that a (v; l; )-SBIBD can be characterized by
the fact that, for every A; B∈B; |A ∩ B|= .
Now we deDne our second new combinatorial design, an external BIBD.
Denition 2.5. A (v; l; ) c-EBIBD (or, external BIBD) is a pair (X;B) such that
l= cu for some integer u¿ 2, and the following properties are satisDed:
1. |X |= |B|= v.
2. Every B∈B is expressed as a disjoint union B= B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bu, where |B1|= · · ·=
|Bu|= c, and B ⊆ X (hence, |B|= l for all B∈B).
3. For each i; 16 i6 u, we have that the multiset union
⋃
B∈B Bi = cX .
4. For every A; B∈B; A = B, we have that ∑i =j |Ai ∩ Bj|= .
It can be shown that the parameters of an EBIBD are not independent; in fact,
(v− 1) = l(l− c) as shown below.
Lemma 2.2. Each element x appears in l blocks.
Proof. Suppose that x appears in r blocks. Count in two ways the number of pairs
(B; x) such that x∈B, where B is a block. Then we have
vl= vr
because |X |= |B|= v and |B|= l. Therefore, r = l.
Theorem 2.3. In a (v; l; ) c-EBIBD,
(v− 1) = l(l− c):
Proof. Fix a block A arbitrarily. We count in two ways the number N of pairs (B; x),
where B = A is a block and x is an element such that x∈Ai and x∈Bj for some i = j.
First there are v− 1 blocks B other than A. For each B = A, the number of such x
is  from property 4. Therefore, N = (v− 1).
Next Dx x∈A arbitrarily and suppose that x∈Ai. From Lemma 2.2, x appears in
l blocks. Further from property 3, we can see that the number of blocks B such that
x∈Bj with some j = i is l− c. Therefore, N = l(l− c).
Hence (v− 1) = l(l− c).
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Corollary 2.4. In a (v; l; ) c-EBIBD, there cannot exist two blocks A and B such
that Ai = Bi; 16 i6 u.
Proof. Suppose that Ai = Bi; 16 i6 u. Then  = 0, and Theorem 2.3 implies that
l= c, or equivalently, u= 1. This contradicts the condition that u¿ 2.
2.3. The relation between EDF and EBIBD
In this subsection, we show that a (v; c; ) u-EDF is equivalent to a (v; l; ) c-EBIBD
with a particular automorphism.
Suppose (X;B) is a (v; l; ) c-EBIBD. Let Sym(X ) denote the symmetric group of all
v! permutations of the elements of X . A permutation ∈Sym(X ) is an automorphism
of (X;B) provided that there is a permutation of B, say , such that
(Bi) = ((B))i
for all B∈B and for 16 i6 u. In other words,  maps blocks to blocks in a way
that respects the partitions B= B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bu. The set of all automorphisms of (X;B),
denoted Aut(X;B), is a subgroup of Sym(X ) that is called the automorphism group
of (X;B).
A subgroup  of Sym(X ) is sharply transitive if, for every x∈X and for every
x′ ∈X , there exists a unique ∈ such that (x)= x′. Any additive abelian group, say
(X;+), has a natural representation as a sharply transitive subgroup of Sym(X ). To be
precise, each group element g∈X corresponds to a permutation g of X deDned as
follows: g(h) = g+ h for all h∈X .
Suppose that (X;+) is an abelian group and  is its representation as a sharply
transitive subgroup of Sym(X ). Further, suppose that (X;B) is a (v; l; ) c-EBIBD
such that  is a subgroup of Aut(X;B). Then we say that (X;B) has (X;+) as a
sharply transitive automorphism group.
After proving a preliminary lemma, we will state and prove the main theorem of
this section.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose T1; T2 ⊆ X , where (X;+) is an additive Abelian group. Let
a∈X . Then
|T1 ∩ (T2 + a)|= |{(s; t): s∈T1; t ∈T2; s− t = a}|:
Proof. Denote Da = {(s; t): s∈T1; t ∈T2; s − t = a}. Suppose x∈T1 ∩ (T2 + a). Then
x∈T1 and x−a∈T2, so (x; x−a)∈Da. Conversely, if (x; y)∈Da, then x∈T1∩(T2+a).
Thus we have a bijection from T1 ∩ (T2 + a) to Da.
Theorem 2.6. Let (X;+) be an additive Abelian group of order v. A (v; l; ) c-EBIBD
having (X;+) as a sharply transitive automorphism group, say (X;B), is equivalent
to a (v; c; ) u-EDF over X such that l= cu.
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Proof. Suppose {D1; : : : ; Du} is a (v; c; ) u-EDF over X . For 16 i6 u and for g∈X ,
deDne Bgi = Di + g. For g∈X , deDne Bg =
⋃u
i=1 B
g
i and then deDne the collection of
blocks B to consist of the v blocks Bg; g∈X .
At this point, we do not know if these blocks are all distinct. We will prove that
(X;B) is a (v; l; ) c-EBIBD having (X;+) as a sharply transitive automorphism group
(which shows that the blocks are, in fact, distinct).
Property 2 is satisDed since Di ∩ Dj = ∅ if i = j. Property 3 is also obvious since
Bgi = Di + g for all i and g.
Let’s consider property 4. Let g; h∈X; g = h. We want to compute ∑i =j |Bgi ∩ Bhj |.
Since Bgi = Di + g and B
h
j = Dj + h, we have that
|Bgi ∩ Bhj |= |(Di + g) ∩ (Dj + h)|= |(Di ∩ (Dj + h− g)|
= |{(s; t): s∈Di; t ∈Dj; s− t = h− g}|;
where the last equation is obtained by applying Lemma 2.5 with T1 =Di; T2 =Dj and
a= h− g. Now, we have that∑
i =j
|Bgi ∩ Bhj |=
∑
i =j
|{(s; t): s∈Di; t ∈Dj; s− t = h− g}|= ;
since ∪i =j(Di−Dj) contains the element h−g exactly  times. Hence, we have proved
property 4.
By property 4, there should be no two blocks A and B such that Ai=Bi for 16 i6 u.
This implies property 1. Finally, it is obvious that (X;B) has (X;+) as a sharply
transitive automorphism group by the way that (X;B) was constructed.
Let’s look now at the converse. Suppose that (X;B) is a (v; l; ) c-EBIBD having
(X;+) as a sharply transitive automorphism group. Pick any A∈B, and deDne Di =
Ai; 16 i6 u. We will show that {D1; : : : ; Du} is a (v; c; ) u-EDF.
Property 1 is obvious, so let’s look at property 2. Let g∈X; g = 0, and denote by
#g the number of occurrences of g in ∪i =j(Di − Dj). (We want to show that #g = .)
Clearly, we have
#g =
∑
i =j
|{(s; t): s∈Ai; t ∈Aj; s− t = g}|=
∑
i =j
|(Ai ∩ (Aj + g)|;
where we apply Lemma 2.5 with T1 = Ai; T2 = Aj and a= g.
Now, since (X;+) is a sharply transitive automorphism group of (X;B) we see that
B= A+ g∈B. Hence, #g =
∑
i =j |Ai ∩ Bj|=  since (X;B) is a (v; l; ) c-EBIBD.
3. Application to splitting A-codes
In this section, we show that an optimal splitting A-code can be obtained from a
(v; c; ) u-EDF.
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3.1. Splitting A-code
In the model of authentication codes (A-codes), the transmitter T and the receiver
R share a common encoding rule (or key) e. The key e is chosen according to some
speciDed probability distribution. Given a source state (plaintext) s; T computes a
message m= e(s) and sends m to R. R accepts or rejects m based on e.
It is possible that more than one message can be used to communicate a particular
source state s; this is called splitting. In this case, a message m is computed as m =
e(s; r), where r is a random number chosen from some speciDed Dnite set. If we deDne
e(s), {m: e(s; r) = m for some r};
then splitting means that |e(s)|¿ 1. Note also that e(s)∩e(sˆ)=∅ if s = sˆ, for otherwise
decoding would be impossible.
Let
S , {s}; M , {m}; E , {e}; and +(e),
⋃
s∈S
e(s):
We say that e accepts m if m∈ +(e).
In an impersonation attack, the opponent O sends a message m to the receiver; O
succeeds if m∈ +(e). The impersonation attack probability PI is deDned as
PI , max
m∈M
Pr(m∈ +(e)); (3)
where the probability is computed over the set of keys E.
In a substitution attack, the opponent O observes a message m transmitted by T ,
and then substitutes m with another message mˆ. O succeeds if m∈ e(s) and mˆ∈ e(sˆ),
where s = sˆ. In other words, the receiver accepts mˆ as authentic and is misled as to
the state of the source. The substitution attack probability PS is deDned as follows.
PS ,
∑
m
Pr(T sends m)max
mˆ∈M
Pr(m∈ e(s); mˆ∈ e(sˆ); s = sˆ |m∈ +(e));
where the probability is computed over the set of keys E. Here are some known bounds
on attack probabilities and the number of keys in a (splitting) A-code.
Proposition 3.1 (Soete [5]). PI¿mine∈E |+(e)|=|M |.
Proposition 3.2 (Soete [5], Blundo et al. [1]). PS¿mine∈E(|+(e)| − maxs∈S |e(s)|)=
(|M | − 1).
(The bound on PS in [5] was corrected as stated above in [1].)
Proposition 3.3 (Simmons [13], Brickell [2]). |E|¿ 1=(PIPS).
Finally, we say that an A-code has perfect secrecy if the opponent O has no infor-
mation about the source state s given a message m. Formally,
Pr(S = s |M = m) = Pr(S = s)
for all s∈ S and m∈M .
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3.2. Optimum splitting A-codes constructed from EDF
In this subsection, we show that an optimal splitting A-code can be obtained from
a (v; c; ) u-EDF.
Theorem 3.4. If there exists a (v; c; 1) u-EDF {D1; : : : ; Du} over an Abelian group
(X;+), then there exists a splitting A-code with perfect secrecy, which meets the
bounds of Propositions 3.1–3.3, such that
|E|= |M |= v; |S|= u; and |e(s)|= c; ∀e; s:
Proof. Consider a splitting A-code such that E =M = X; S = {1; : : : ; u} and
e(i) = {e + x: x∈Di}
for all e∈X and all i∈ S. Then we have
|E|= |M |= |X |= v= c2u(u− 1) + 1 (from Eq: (1));
|e(i)|= |Di|= c; and
|+(e)|=
∑
i∈S
|e(i)|= uc; ∀e∈E: (4)
Suppose that E and S are uniformly distributed. It is clear that this A-code has perfect
secrecy because m= e + x and e is uniformly distributed over X . Let’s compute PI .
PI =max
m∈M
Pr(m∈ +(e)) = maxm∈M |{e∈E: m∈ +(e)}||E| =
uc
v
:
Since |M |= v, we have equality in Proposition 3.1.
Next, we compute PS . Let m; mˆ∈M; m = mˆ. First, we observe that
Pr(m∈ e(i); mˆ∈ e(j); i = j |m∈ +(e)) = |{e∈E: m∈ e(i); mˆ∈ e(j); i = j}||{e∈E: m∈ +(e)}|
=
|{e∈E: m− e∈Di; mˆ− e∈Dj; i = j}|
|{e∈E: m∈ +(e)}| =
1
uc
;
since m− mˆ occurs exactly once as a di>erence in ∪i =j(Di − Dj). On the other hand,
for any e∈E, we have
|+(e)| −max
i∈S
|e(i)|= uc − c = c(u− 1)
and
|M | − 1 = c2u(u− 1);
so it follows that
|+(e)| −maxi∈S |e(i)|
|M | − 1 =
1
uc
:
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Hence we have equality in Proposition 3.2. Finally, we compute
1
PIPS
=
v
uc
× uc = v= |E|;
so we have equality in Proposition 3.3.
4. Application to secret sharing schemes
4.1. DeAnition of security against cheaters
In a (k; n) threshold secret sharing scheme, let S be the set of secrets. In the
destribution phase, a dealer outputs a vector (v1; : : : ; vn) on input s∈S, where vi is
called a share of participant Pi. In the reconstruction phase, the following conditions
must hold.
1. any k or more shares determine the secret s, and
2. no set of k − 1 or fewer shares have any information on the secret s.
Let S denote a random variable distributed over a Dnite set S. Let Vi denote the
random variable induced by vi and let
Vi , {vi: Pr(Vi = vi)¿ 0}:
Denition 4.1. For w∈Vi1 × · · · ×Vik , deDne
Sec(i1 ;:::;ik )(w),
{
s if ∃s such that Pr(S = s|Vi1 · · ·Vik = w) = 1;
⊥ otherwise:
Note that we will usually omit the subscript (i1; : : : ; ik) for readability.
Denition 4.2. Suppose that k−1 cheaters Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b=(vi1 ; : : : ; vik−1 ) as their
shares, where vij denotes the share of Pij . We say that Pik is cheated by the list of
forged shares b′ = (v′i1 ; : : : ; v
′
ik−1 ) if Sec(b
′; vik )∈S and Sec(b′; vik ) = Sec(b; vik ).
Denition 4.3. We deDne the cheating probability as follows:
Cheat(Vi1 ; : : : ; Vik−1 ), maxb
max
b′
Pr(Pik is cheated by b
′|Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b):
We say that a (k; n) threshold scheme is -secure if
Cheat(Vi1 ; : : : ; Vik−1 )6 
for any {i1; : : : ; ik−1} ⊆ {1; : : : ; n}.
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4.2. A new bound on |Vi|
Recently, the following lower bound on |Vi| was shown.
Proposition 4.1 (Ogata and Kurosawa [10]). In a -secure (k; n) threshold secret shar-
ing scheme,
|Vi|¿ 1 + |S| − 1 : (5)
In this subsection, we derive a more tight lower bound on |Vi| for ¡ 1=|S|.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that S is uniformly distributed in a -secure (k; n) threshold
secret sharing scheme. Then
|Vi|¿ 1 + |S| − 1|S|2 : (6)
Proof. Assume that cheaters Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b= (vi1 ; : : : ; vik−1 ) as their shares. Let
Vˆik (s; b), {vik : Sec(b; vik ) = s}:
First, we prove that
|Vˆik (s; b)|¿
1
|S| ; (7)
for any {i1; : : : ; ik−1} ⊂ {1; : : : ; n};∀b=Vi1×· · ·×Vik−1 and ∀s∈S. Consider a cheaters’
strategy as follows. The cheaters choose sˆ∈S arbitrarily and then choose xˆ∈ Vˆik (sˆ; b)
such that Pr(Vik = xˆ |Vi1 · · ·Vik−1 =b; S= sˆ) is the maximum. Finally, they open b′ such
that Sec(b′; xˆ) ∈ {sˆ;⊥} arbitrarily. Pik is cheated if he has xˆ and S = sˆ. Therefore,
max
b′
Pr(Pik is cheated by b
′|Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b)
¿Pr(S = sˆ|Vi1 · · ·Vik−1 = b)Pr(Vik = xˆ|Vi1 · · ·Vik−1 = b; S = sˆ)
=Pr(S = sˆ) max
x∈Vˆik (sˆ;b)
Pr(Vik = x|Vi1 · · ·Vik−1 = b; S = sˆ)
¿ (1=|S|)× (1=|Vˆik (sˆ; b)|):
Since we consider a -secure scheme,
¿
1
|S‖Vˆik (sˆ; b)|
:
Then we obtain Eq. (7).
Next consider a cheaters’ strategy as follows. Pi1 opens v
′
i1 ∈Vi1\{vi1} randomly.
That is,
Pr(v′i1 ) =
{
1=(|Vi1 | − 1) if v′i1 = vi1 ;
0 if v′i1 = vi1 :
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Fig. 1.
Pi2 ; : : : ; Pik−1 open their shares honestly. Suppose that Pik has vik = x. We then consider
Pr(Pik is cheated |Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b):
Since the probability is taken over v′i1 and x, we have
Pr(Pik is cheated |Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b)
=Ev′i1 [Prx(Pik is cheated by v
′
i1 |Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b)]
=Ex[Prv′i1 (Pik is cheated |Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b; Pik has x)]
=Ex
[∑
s∈S
Pr(S = s)Prv′i1 (Pik is cheated |Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b; Pik has x; S = s)
]
=|S|−1Ex
[∑
s∈S
Prv′i1 (Pik is cheated |Vi2 · · ·Vik = d; S = s)
]
; (8)
where d= (vi2 ; : : : ; vik−1 ; x). From Fig. 1, we see that
Prv′i1 (Pik is cheated |Vi2 · · ·Vik = d; S = s)¿
∑
s′ =s |Vˆi1 (s′; d)|
|Vi1 | − 1
: (9)
Therefore, by substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (8), we obtain that
Pr(Pik is cheated |Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b)
¿ |S|−1(|Vi1 | − 1)−1Ex

∑
s∈S
∑
s′ =s
|Vˆi1 (s′; d)|

 : (10)
Finally, we prove Eq. (6). In a -secure scheme, for any cheaters’ strategy,
¿max
b
Pr(Pik is cheated |Pi1 ; : : : ; Pik−1 have b);
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where the probability is taken over the randomness of the cheaters as well as vik .
Hence, from Eq. (7) and (10),
¿max
b
|S|−1(|Vi1 | − 1)−1Ex

∑
s∈S
∑
s′ =s
|Vˆi1 (s′; d)|


¿max
b
|S|−1(|Vi1 | − 1)−1Ex

∑
s∈S
∑
s′ =s
1
|S|


=
|S| − 1
|S|(|Vi1 | − 1)
:
Therefore, we obtain Eq. (6).
Observe that the right hand side of Eq. (6) is bigger than that of Eq. (5) if ¡ 1=|S|.
In the next subsection, we show that the bound of Theorem 4.2 can be met with
equality.
Remark. We cannot remove the condition that S is uniformly distributed from Theorem
4.2 because there exists a counterexample. Consider a (2; 2) threshold secret sharing
scheme such as follows.
Let S={0; 1} and suppose that Pr(S=0)=1=4;Pr(S=1)=3=4. Let V1=V2=Z7. In
what follows, all operations are done over GF(7). First, the dealer D chooses v1 ∈V1
uniformly. Next, if s = 0 then let v2 = −v1. Otherwise, choose a∈{1; 2; 3} uniformly
at random and let v2 = a− v1. The secret is reconstructed as
s=


0 if v1 + v2 = 0;
1 if v1 + v2 ∈{1; 2; 3};
⊥ otherwise:
We will show that this scheme is 1=4-secure. On the other hand, the right hand side
of Eq. (6) is
1 + 42(2− 1)=2 = 9;
which is larger than |V1|= 7.
First in this scheme,
Pr(V2 =−v1|V1 = v1) = Pr(S = 0|V1 = v1) = 1=4
for any v1 ∈V1 because V1 is uniformly distributed. Similarly, we have
Pr(V2 = 1− v1|V1 = v1) = 1=4;
Pr(V2 = 2− v1|V1 = v1) = 1=4;
Pr(V2 = 3− v1|V1 = v1) = 1=4
for all v1 ∈V1.
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Next suppose that a malicous P1 opens v′1 = v1 +1 instead of v1. If P2 has v2 =−v1,
then the secret is s= 0. In this case, however,
v′1 + v2 = v1 + 1− v1 = 1:
Therefore, P2 reconstructs s′ = 1. Hence P2 is cheated. We can further see that if P2
has v2 = 1− v1 or 2− v1 or 3− v1, then P2 is not cheated. Therefore,
Pr(P2 is cheated by v1 + 1|V1 = v1)
=Pr(V2 =−v1|V1 = v1)
=1=4:
Similarly, we can show that
Pr(P2 is cheated by v′1|V1 = v1)6 1=4
for all v′1(= v1). Therefore, this scheme is 1=4-secure.
4.3. Optimal secret sharing scheme constructed from EDF
In this subsection, we show that an optimal secret sharing scheme secure against
cheaters can be obtained by using a (v; c; 1) u-EDF.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that there exists a (v; c; 1) u-EDF such that v is a prime power.
Then there exists a -secure (k; n) threshold scheme which meets the bound of The-
orem 4.2 such that |S|= u and = 1=(cu) for any k6 n¡v.
Proof. Let (D1; : : : ; Du) be a (v; c; 1) u-EDF. Consider the following secret sharing
scheme. The set of secrets is S = {1; : : : ; u}. S is uniformly distributed over S. In
what follows, all operations are done over GF(v).
In the distribution phase, for a secret s∈S, the dealer chooses d∈Ds randomly.
Then, he chooses a random polynomial f(x) of degree k − 1 such that f(0) = d. The
share of Pi is vi = f(i). In the reconstruction phase, k or more participants compute
the constant term d of f(x) by using the Lagrange interpolation formula. They accept
s as the secret i> d∈Ds for some Ds.
We show that the above scheme satisDes our requirements. Without loss of generality,
suppose that P1; : : : ; Pk−1 have shares b= (v1; : : : ; vk−1) and Pk has share vk . Fix a list
of forged shares b′ = (v′1; : : : ; v
′
k−1). From the Lagrange formula, we have
k−1∑
j=1
3jvj + 3kvk = d∈Ds; (11)
where 3j =
∏
l=j;16l6k −l=(j − l) for 16 j6 k. DeDne
T , {x:
k−1∑
j=1
3jvj + 3kx∈Di for some i}
and
V˜k(b→ b′), {vk : Pk is cheated by b′}:
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Thus T is the set of possible values of vk (given b), and V˜k(b → b′) represents the
possible values of vk that will lead to Pk being cheated.
Note that there is a bijection between T and
⋃
i Di for a Dxed b since 3k = 0.
Also, vk is uniformly distributed over T because d is uniformly distributed over
⋃
i Di.
Therefore, we have
Pr(Pk is cheated by b′|P1; : : : ; Pk−1 have b) = |V˜k(b→ b
′)|
|T | : (12)
Now, we have
|T |=
u∑
i=1
|Di|= cu; (13)
and
|V˜k(b→ b′)|= |{x: Sec(b′; x)∈S;Sec(b′; x) = Sec(b; x)}|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣

x:
k−1∑
j=1
3jvj + 3kx∈Di;
k−1∑
j=1
3jv′j + 3kx∈Di′ ; i = i′


∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣

d: d∈Di; d−
k−1∑
j=1
3jvj +
k−1∑
j=1
3jv′j ∈Di′ ; i = i′


∣∣∣∣∣∣= 1 or 0;
from Theorem 2.1 since = 1. Hence,
Pr(Pk is cheated by b′|P1; : : : ; Pk−1 have b) = 1cu or 0;
and
= Cheat(V1; : : : ; Vk−1) =
1
cu
=
1
c|S| :
Finally, from Eq. (1) since |S|= u for ∀j, we have
|Vj|= v= c2u(u− 1) + 1 = |S| − 12|S| + 1:
4.4. EBIBD from secret sharing schemes
In this subsection, we prove a weak converse of Theorem 4.3. Recall that a (v; c; )
u-EDF is equivalent to a (v; l; ) c-EBIBD with a particular automorphism from The-
orem 2.6.
Theorem 4.4. For a uniformly distributed S, suppose that there exists a -secure (k; n)
threshold scheme which meets the bound of Theorem 4.2 for all i. That is, for all i,
|Vi|= 1 + |S| − 1|S|2 :
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Also, suppose that c, 1=(|S|) is an integer. Then there exists a (v; c|S|; 1) c-EBIBD
such that
v, 1 + |S|(|S| − 1)c2: (14)
Proof. Note that |Vj|=v for any j. Let S={1; 2; : : : ; |S|} and V, {1; 2; : : : ; v}=Vj
for any j. Fix v2; : : : ; vk−1 arbitrarily. For each i∈V, deDne
Bi;s , {vk : Sec(i; v2; : : : ; vk−1; vk) = s}
and
Bi,
⋃
s∈S
Bi;s
= {vk : Sec(i; v2; : : : ; vk−1; vk)∈S}:
We will show that (V; {Bi}) is the desired EBIBD. Property 1 is obvious. To prove
property 2, Drst we show that
|Bi;s|= c for ∀(i; s): (15)
If the equality of Eq. (6) is satisDed, then the equality of Eq. (7) must be satisDed
from the proof of Theorem 4.2. Therefore,
|Vˆk(s; (i; v2; : : : ; vk−1))|= 1|S| = c for ∀(i; s): (16)
This means Eq. (15) because Bi;s = Vˆk(s; (i; v2; : : : ; vk−1)).
Further, since k participants can determine the secret uniquely, it must be that Bi;s ∩
Bi; sˆ = 5 if s = sˆ. Hence, property 2 is satisDed for u= |S| because Bi =
⋃
s∈S Bi;s.
Let’s now consider property 3. DeDne
Bˆi; s , {v1: Sec(v1; v2; : : : ; vk−1; i) = s}:
We can prove that
|Bˆi; s|= c for ∀(i; s) (17)
in the same way as Eq. (15). Then for all s∈S, it follows that the multiset union⋃
i∈V Bi;s=cV because vk=i appears in |Bˆi; s|=c blocks for any i∈V. Hence, property
3 is satisDed.
Finally, let’s consider property 4. Recall that
B1; s = {vk : Pk computes s when P1 opens 1};
Bh; sˆ = {vk : Pk computes sˆ when P1 opens h};
B1 =
⋃
s∈S
B1; s; and
|B1|= c|S| (from Eq: (15)):
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Without loss of generality, suppose that P1 has v1 = 1 as his original share. Then we
have
Pr(Pk is cheated when P1 opens h)
=
∑
s =sˆ
|B1; s ∩ Bh; sˆ|
|B1| =
∑
s =sˆ
|B1; s ∩ Bh; sˆ|
c|S| : (18)
DeDne a binary (v− 1)× c|S| matrix G = (gh;j) as follows:
gh;j =
{
1 if j∈B1; s ∩ Bh+1; sˆ for some s = sˆ
0 otherwise:
Let H denote the Hamming weight. Let wj be the jth column of G. Suppose that
j∈B1; s. Then from Eq. (17), we have
H (wj) =
∑
sˆ =s
|Bˆj; sˆ|= c(|S| − 1);
H (G) = c|S| × c(|S| − 1) = c2|S|(|S| − 1):
Next, let uh be the hth row of G. Then
max
h
H (uh)¿
c2|S|(|S| − 1)
v− 1 :
Further, it is easy to see that
H (uh) =
∑
i =j
|B1; i ∩ Bh+1; j|:
Therefore,
max
h¿2
∑
i =j
|B1; i ∩ Bh;j|¿ c
2|S|(|S| − 1)
v− 1 :
Then from Eq. (18), we obtain that
¿
c(|S| − 1)
v− 1 :
On the other hand, from Eq. (14), we see that
= 1=(c|S|) = c(|S| − 1)=(v− 1); (19)
since c = 1=(|S|). Hence it must be that∑
i =j
|B1; i ∩ Bh;j|= c
2|S|(|S| − 1)
v− 1 = 1
for any h. (The last equality comes from Eq. (19).) Therefore, property 4 is
satisDed.
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5. Splitting BIBD and Fisher-type inequality
In this section, we introduce a notion of splitting BIBDs and derive a Fisher-type
inequality. Then we show a weak equivalence with splitting A-codes. Finally, it is
shown that an EDF implies a splitting BIBD.
5.1. DeAnition
Denition 5.1. A (v; b; l=cu; )-splitting BIBD is a pair (V;B) such that the following
properties are satisDed, where Bi ∈B is called a block and Bi ⊆ V .
1. |V |= v; |B|= b.
2. Every Bi ∈B is expressed as a disjoint union Bi = Bi;1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bi;u, where |Bi;1| =
· · ·= |Bi;u|= c and |Bi|= l= cu.
3. For each x; y∈V (x = y), there exist exactly  blocks Bi=Bi;1∪· · ·∪Bi;u such that
x∈Bi;j; y∈Bi;k ; j = k:
Example 5.1. We show a (9; 9; 4 = 2× 2; 1)-splitting BIBD.
V = {1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9};
B1 = {{1; 2}; {3; 5}};
B2 = {{2; 3}; {4; 6}};
B3 = {{3; 4}; {5; 7}};
B4 = {{4; 5}; {6; 8}};
B5 = {{5; 6}; {7; 9}};
B6 = {{6; 7}; {8; 1}};
B7 = {{7; 8}; {9; 2}};
B8 = {{8; 9}; {1; 3}};
B9 = {{9; 1}; {2; 4}}:
For example, for x = 1 and y = 2 or 4; B9 satisDes property 3.
5.2. Fisher-type inequality
We Drst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. In a (v; b; l = cu; )-splitting BIBD, each element of V is contained in
exactly
r = (v− 1)=(l− c) (20)
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blocks. Further,
b= v(v− 1)=l(l− c): (21)
Proof. First for any x∈V , count in two ways the number of pairs (y; Bi), where y∈V
and Bi is a block such that x∈Bi;j and y∈Bi;k with j = k. Then
(v− 1) = r(l− c):
Therefore,
r = (v− 1)=(l− c):
Next count in two ways the number of pairs ((x; y); Bi), where x = y and Bi is a
block such that x∈Bi;j and y∈Bi;k with j = k. Then

(
v
2
)
= b
l(l− c)
2
:
Therefore,
b= v(v− 1)=l(l− c):
The right hand sides of Eqs. (20) and (21) must be integers if a splitting BIBD
exists. We next show a Fisher-type inequality for splitting BIBDs, which is also a
necessary condition for the existence of splitting BIBDs.
Theorem 5.2. If there exists a (v; b; l= cu; )-splitting BIBD(V;B), then
b¿ v=u:
Proof. For
V = {x1; : : : ; xv};
let
Px1 , (1; 0; : : : ; 0);
Px2 , (0; 1; : : : ; 0);
...
Pxv , (0; 0; : : : ; 1):
DeDne V˜ to be the v-dimensional real vector space having basis { Px1; : : : ; Pxv}. For each
Bi;j, deDne a vector
Bij ,
∑
xk∈Bi; j
Pxk
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Let V˜
′
be the subspace of V˜ spanned by the vectors Bij,
V˜
′
, {Bij: 16 i6 b; 16 j6 u}
It is clear that V˜
′ ⊆ V˜ . We will show that V˜ ⊆ V˜ ′. Let
Bi ,
∑
j
Bij;
Pvxj ,
∑
Bi :xj∈Bi
PBi for xj ∈V;
PX ,
∑
xi∈V
Pxi =
1
r
∑
i; j
Bij: (from Lemma 5:1)
(22)
Then, Pvxj ∈ V˜
′
; PX ∈ V˜ ′. On the other hand, from Eq. (22) and the deDnition of splitting
BIBD, we have
Pvx =
∑
Bi :x∈Bi
∑
j
Bij
=
∑
Bi :x∈Bi

 ∑
j:x∈Bi; j
Bij +
∑
j:x ∈Bi; j
Bij


=
∑
Bi; j :x∈Bi; j
Bij + ( PX − Px);
Px = PX − 1


 Pvx − ∑
Bi; j :x∈Bi; j
Bij

 :
Therefore,
Px∈ V˜ ′
for all x∈V . Hence V˜ = V˜ ′. Then bu¿ v because dim V˜ = v and dim V˜ ′ is at most
bu. This means that b¿ v=u.
5.3. Weak equivalence with splitting A-codes
Denition 5.2. We say that a splitting A-code is c-splitting if
|e(s)|= c
for any e∈E and any s∈ S.
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By using the notation of Section 3.1, let
|M |= v; |S|= u; |+(e)|= l (=cu);
S = {s1; : : : ; su};
e−1(m), s if m= e(s; r) for some r
for a c-splitting A-code.
From Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.3. In a c-splitting A-code,
PI¿ l=v; PS¿ (l− c)=(v− 1):
Now we show a connection between c-splitting A-codes and splitting BIBDs.
Theorem 5.4. If there exists a c-splitting A-code which satisAes the equalities of
Corollary 5.3, then
|E|¿ v(v− 1)
l(l− c) : (23)
Further, the rows of the encoding matrix forms a (v; |E|; l = cu; 1)-splitting BIBD if
the above equality holds.
Proof. If the equality of Proposition 3.2 is satisDed, then
|{e: e−1(m) = e−1(m′)}|¿ 1
for any m = m′ from the proof of [1]. Now count the number of {m;m′} such that
e−1(m) = e−1(m′) for some e in two ways. Since each e accepts l=c|S|=cu messages,
|E|l(l− c)¿ v(v− 1):
Therefore, Eq. (23) holds.
Next, if the equality of Eq. (23) is satisDed, then
|{e: e−1(m) = e−1(m′)}|= 1 (24)
for any m = m′. Let
Be , e(s1) ∪ e(s2) ∪ · · · ∪ e(su):
Then (V;B)=(M; {Be | e∈E}) is a (v; |E|; l=cu; 1)-splitting BIBD from Eq. (24).
Theorem 5.5. If there exists a (v; |E|; l = cu; 1)-splitting BIBD, then there exists a
c-splitting A-code such that
1. all the equalities of Corollary 5.3 and Theorem 5.4 are satisAed.
2. |M |= v; |S|= u.
3. Each source state occurs with equal probability.
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Proof. Let |M |= v. For each block
B= B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bu;
deDne an encoding rule as
e(s1) = B1; : : : ; e(su) = Bu:
Example 5.2. We show an optimum 2-splitting A-code obtained from (9; 9; 4 = 2 ×
2; 1)-splitting BIBD.
s1 s2
e1 {m1; m2} {m3; m5}
e2 {m2; m3} {m4; m6}
e3 {m3; m4} {m5; m7}
e4 {m4; m5} {m6; m8}
e5 {m5; m6} {m7; m9}
e6 {m6; m7} {m8; m1}
e7 {m7; m8} {m9; m2}
e8 {m8; m9} {m1; m3}
e9 {m9; m1} {m2; m4}
5.4. EDF implies splitting BIBD
Theorem 5.6. If there exists a (v; c; ) u-EDF {D1; : : : ; Du} over an Abelian group
(X;+), then there exists a (v; v; l= cu; )-splitting BIBD.
Proof. For each i∈X , let
Bi;j = {i + z: z ∈Dj};
Bi = Bi;1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bi;u:
DeDne B = {B1; : : : ; Bv}. We claim that (X;B) is a (v; v; l = cu; )-splitting BIBD.
Properties 1 and 2 are obvious.
Let’s consider property 3. For any x = y, we can see that
|{Bi: x∈Bi;j; y∈Bi;k ; j = k}|
=|{Bi: x − i∈Dj; y − i∈Dk; j = k}|
=
because x − y occurs exactly  times in ∪j =k(Dj − Dk). Hence we have proved
property 3.
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